The (Futile) Search for a Common Law Right of Confrontation:  Beyond \u3ci\u3eBrasier\u3c/i\u3e\u27s Irrelevance to (Perhaps) Relevant American Cases by Jonakait, Randolph N.
Journal of Law and Policy
Volume 15
Issue 2
SYMPOSIUM:
Crawford and Beyond: Revisited in Dialogue
Article 3
2008
The (Futile) Search for a Common Law Right of
Confrontation: Beyond Brasier's Irrelevance to
(Perhaps) Relevant American Cases
Randolph N. Jonakait
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Law and
Policy by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Randolph N. Jonakait, The (Futile) Search for a Common Law Right of Confrontation: Beyond Brasier's Irrelevance to (Perhaps) Relevant
American Cases, 15 J. L. & Pol'y (2007).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp/vol15/iss2/3
JONAKAIT.DOC 9/22/2007 12:34 AM 
 
471 
THE (FUTILE) SEARCH FOR A COMMON 
LAW RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION: 
BEYOND BRASIER’S IRRELEVANCE TO 
(PERHAPS) RELEVANT AMERICAN CASES 
Randolph N. Jonakait∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent interpreters of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation 
Clause have “Frankensteined” Rex v. Brasier back into new life. 
For over two centuries, no one seems to have thought the 1779 
English case important for understanding the U.S. Constitution, 
but now some see Brasier as infusing fresh content into the 
Sixth Amendment’s right of confrontation. 
Crawford v. Washington1 first breathed the life back into 
Brasier. Even though the Framers of the Constitution hardly 
discussed it,2 Crawford asserted that the Confrontation Clause 
“is most naturally read as a reference to the right of 
confrontation at common law, admitting only those exceptions 
established at the time of the founding.”3 This assertion assumes 
                                                          
∗ Professor, New York Law School. The author thanks Stephen Newman 
and Amelia Jonakait for their suggestions. 
1 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
2 See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: 
An Alternative History, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 77, 77 (1995) [hereinafter, The 
Origins of the Confrontation Clause]. “The origins of the Confrontation 
Clause are murky. Early American documents almost never mention the 
right, and the traditional sources for divining the Framers’ intent yield almost 
no information about the Clause.” Id. 
3 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54. See also id. at 43 (noting that “The 
founding generation’s immediate source of the [confrontation] concept . . . 
was the common law”). Id. 
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that there was a common law right of confrontation and implies 
that cases can be found that shed light on this common law 
right.4 
For some who accept these assumptions, Brasier is such a 
ruling, and although not mentioned by the Supreme Court in the 
eighteenth, nineteenth or twentieth centuries, the Court’s two 
recent Confrontation Clause cases have Brasier references,5 as 
do briefs to the Court and academic discussions.6 Fairly read, 
however, Brasier says nothing about the Confrontation Clause. 
If a common law right of confrontation is to be found, we must 
look elsewhere for the content of that right. 
Part I of this Article identifies the most straightforward 
reading of Rex v. Brasier. The decision was based on the 
principle that out-of-court statements from an incompetent 
witness could not be admitted in a criminal trial. The case says 
nothing about the hearsay rule generally, hearsay exceptions, or 
the right of confrontation. 
Part II discusses a Framing-Era American case, State v. 
Baynard,7 that is quite similar to, and consistent with Brasier. 
Baynard excluded out-of-court statements from a witness who 
would have been incompetent to testify in court, and it confirms 
that Brasier said little, if anything, about a right of 
confrontation. Baynard does, however, indicate that American 
courts of the Framing Era had a general prohibition on hearsay. 
Part III contends that if Framing Era views are to control the 
                                                          
4 See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Too-Easy Historical Assumptions of 
Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 219, 227 (2005): 
[Crawford] has assumed that the Confrontation Clause was 
incorporating a common law right of confrontation; therefore, an 
English common law right of confrontation must be 
discoverable. The cited English cases are assumed to be the 
most relevant ones for determining the English right, and then a 
right of confrontation is found in them. Without those 
assumptions, that right is not apparent. 
Id. 
5 See infra at note 13. 
6 See infra at notes 11-15, 19. 
7 1794 WL 184 (Del. O. & T. 1794). 
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meaning of today’s Confrontation Clause, it is American views 
from that era that are the most important, and the best sources 
of American viewpoints and ideas are American cases, not 
English cases. This section will examine in detail one such case, 
The Ulysses,8 while briefly referring to other, similar cases that 
rule on the admissibility of out-of-court statements, and will 
explore how American courts in the Framing Era enforced a 
general prohibition on hearsay and recognized only limited 
hearsay exceptions. 
I.  REX V. BRASIER 
In the 1779 case of Rex v. Brasier, Brasier was convicted of 
assault with intent to commit rape of a girl under seven years 
old. The girl did not testify and “was not sworn or produced as 
a witness on trial.” Instead, the girl’s mother and a woman who 
lodged with the mother testified that the girl “immediately on 
her coming home, told all the circumstances of the injury which 
had been done her. . . .” The case went to the Twelve Judges,9 
who rendered a unanimous, single-paragraph opinion, 
concluding that “the evidence of the information which the 
infant, had given to her mother the other witnesses, ought not to 
have been received.” The court’s full reasoning stated: 
That no testimony whatever can be legally received 
except upon oath; and that an infant, though under 
the age of seven years, may be sworn in a criminal 
prosecution, provided such infant appears, on strict 
                                                          
8 24 F.Cas. 515 (C.C.D. Mass. 1800) (No. 14,300). 
9 See John Langbein, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 
212-13 (2003). Langbein writes: 
When a point of difficulty arose that a trial judge was reluctant 
to decide on his own, especially when capital sanctions were 
involved and the convict would otherwise be promptly executed, 
the judge could defer sentencing and refer the question to a 
meeting held back in London of all the judges, commonly 
twelve, of the three common law courts. 
Id. 
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examination by the Court, to possess a sufficient 
knowledge of the nature and consequences of an 
oath . . . , for there is no precise or fixed rule as to 
the time within which infants are excluded from 
giving evidence; but their admissibility depends upon 
the sense and reason they entertain of the danger and 
impiety of falsehood, which is to be collected from 
their answers to questions propounded to them by the 
Court; but if they are found incompetent to take an 
oath their testimony cannot be received. The Judges 
determined, therefore, that the evidence of the 
information which the infant had given to her mother 
and the other witness, ought not to have been 
received.10 
Certainly, at first glance, the case is not an application of the 
common law right of confrontation. The court neither said that it 
was applying such a right, nor did the court indicate that such a 
right existed. The opinion gave no inkling that the statement was 
inadmissible because it had not been confronted, or that its 
admission would deny the accused cross-examination. Cross-
examination and confrontation go without mention, and the 
opinion does not even refer to the disputed evidence as hearsay. 
The case made no general pronouncements about out-of-court 
statements, much less about hearsay exceptions. 
It seems to take a highly creative, and perhaps a highly 
anachronistic, eye to find a confrontation meaning in Brasier.11 
Instead, the clearest rules from the case are that there is no fixed 
age at which a child can be sworn in to testify and that a child 
under seven years old can be sworn in to testify if the trial 
court’s “strict examination” reveals that she understands the 
nature and consequences of an oath.12 
                                                          
10 The decision concludes by noting that the “prisoner received a 
pardon.. . . .” See generally, King v. Brasier, 1 Leach 199 (K.B. 1779). 
11 See Davis v. Washington, Brief for Petitioner, 2005 U.S. S.Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 965, 54, stating about Brasier that “[i]t is hard to miss the 
confrontation rhetoric” in it. 
12 Brasier has been cited by American courts for the proposition that a 
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Brasier clearly indicates that it was improper to admit the 
child’s out-of-court statements. The court’s rationale, however, 
cannot be meaningfully ascribed without answering now 
unanswerable questions. For example, had the child been 
produced at trial, and the court examined her and concluded that 
she could be sworn, would her out-of-court statements have been 
admissible?13 
We cannot know whether the court was declaring that what 
today would be known as an excited utterance was inadmissible. 
Statements were made to the mother and the lodger 
“immediately” upon the girl coming home, but the opinion does 
not say exactly how long after the assault the girl made these 
statements, and whether the assertions would today qualify as an 
excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule is unclear.14 
The facts point out the lack of substantial corroboration for 
the girl’s statements by stating that “there was no fact or 
circumstance to confirm the information which the child had 
given, except that the prisoner lodged at the very place which 
she had described, and that she, on seeing him the next day, had 
                                                          
child’s ability to take an oath is not dependent upon a fixed age. See, e.g., 
State v. Edwards, 79 N.C. 648, 650 (1878); People v. Bernal, 10 Cal. 66, 
67 (1858). 
13 The brief for Davis in Davis v. Washington contended that when the 
Constitution was adopted, evidence of a fresh complaint of a sexual assault 
was not admissible unless the victim testified. To support that proposition, 
the brief referred to Brasier, saying “Thus, for instance, the King’s Bench in 
1779 held that an alleged victim’s complaint made to her mother 
‘immediately upon coming home’ from an alleged assault was inadmissible 
because the victim was not sworn or produced as a witness on the trial.’” 
Davis v. Washington, Brief for Petitioner, 2005 U.S. S.Ct. Briefs LEXIS 
965, *53-54. In the reply brief, Davis asserted that Brasier held that the 
“children’s out-of-court statements were admissible only if they testified.” 
Davis v. Washington, Reply Brief for Petitioner, 2006 U.S. S.Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 305, at *18. 
14 Cf. Hammon v. Indiana, Brief for Petitioner, 2005 U.S. S.Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 949, 45, which concludes that Brasier’s holding demonstrates that “at 
the time of the Framing, there was no special rule allowing admissibility of 
accusatorial statements because they were made under stress of excitement.” 
Id. at 45. 
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declared that he was the man. . . .” There is no way to tell why 
the court put such an emphasis on the absence of confirming 
evidence, or whether additional corroboration would have made 
the statement admissible. 
The opinion only states that the girl was neither sworn nor 
produced “on the trial.” Brasier does not mention whether the 
girl was produced and sworn at a pretrial proceeding. If the 
opinion was indicating anything about the about the admissibility 
of sworn, pretrial statements, we cannot tell. 
Brasier did state that “testimony” not under oath could not 
be received and that if children “are found incompetent to take 
an oath, “their testimony cannot be received.”15 The court then 
concluded that the out-of-court statements should not have been 
admitted. Perhaps the court was equating hearsay with 
“testimony.”16 If so, Brasier might have modern importance 
because Crawford’s reading of common-law history led it to 
conclude that “the principal evil at which the Confrontation 
Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal 
procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as 
evidence against the accused . . . .”17 Crawford went on to 
conclude that the Confrontation Clause’s core concern was with 
statements used against an accused akin to those from an ex 
parte deposition or examination, which the Court labeled 
“testimonial,” and held that out-of-court testimonial statements 
of an absent declarant can only be admitted if the accused had 
had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.18 Thus, if 
Brasier was equating the girl’s statements with unsworn 
                                                          
15 See Hammon v. Indiana, Brief for Petitioner, 2005 U.S. S.Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 949, 44. 
16 See id.(“Strikingly, and explicitly, the judges referred to the girl’s 
statement as testimony.”); Hammon, Reply Brief for Petitioner, 2006 U.S. 
S.Ct. Briefs LEXIS 329, 16 (noting that Brasier “characteriz[ed] the out-of-
court accusation made by the child . . . as testimonial . . . and so exclud[ed] 
it). See also Richard D. Friedman, Crawford, Davis, and Way Beyond, 15 
J.L. & POL’Y 553, 564 (2007) (referring to girl’s statement as “testimony”). 
17 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004). 
18 Id. at 51-52. 
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testimony, and in doing so was elucidating a common-law right 
of confrontation, the case might tell us something about what 
should be currently considered testimonial.19 
The assumptions necessary to reach this modern meaning, 
however, ought to give substantial pause. Occam’s razor 
suggests that the simplest explanation should be accepted, and 
the simplest explanation for Brasier is that it was only holding 
that the attempted end-run around the competency rules by 
admitting the out-of-court statements from one who was not 
shown to be a competent witness was not valid. The opinion 
says nothing about the admissibility of hearsay from a witness 
who is capable of taking an oath,20 and does not say anything at 
                                                          
19 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006), did not state a 
comprehensive definition of “testimonial” but did conclude: 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police 
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that that 
the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police 
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial 
when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such 
ongoing emergency, and the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially 
relevant to later criminal prosecutions. 
Id. The Court rejected Davis’ reliance on Brasier because it did not involve a 
statement made during an ongoing emergency, concluding, “The case would 
be helpful to Davis if the relevant statement had been the girl’s screams for 
aid as she was being chased by her assailant. But by the time the victim got 
home, her story was an account of a past event.” Id. at 2277. 
 Chief Justice Rehnquist, concurring in the result in Crawford, cited 
Brasier for the proposition that “[u]nder common law, although the courts 
were far from consistent, out-of-court statements made by someone other than 
the accused and not taken under oath, unlike ex parte depositions or 
affidavits, were generally not considered substantive evidence upon which a 
conviction could be based.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69. 
20 Cf. Hammon v. Indiana, Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 44 ( 
noting that “the manifest premise of the judges’ discussion was that if the 
speaker had been an adult it would have been plainly improper for other 
persons to relay her accusations—her ‘testimony’—to court. . .”) Id. See also 
Richard D. Friedman, Crawford, Davis, and Way Beyond, 15 J. L. & POL’Y 
553, 565 (2007) (noting that “[a] premise of the [Brasier] debate was that if 
she had been an adult the statement could not have been used. . .”). 
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all about the content of the Confrontation Clause. 
The crucial question, of course, is not what Brasier’s 
rationale truly was, but how Americans would have treated a 
comparable situation in the Framing Era. If a conception of the 
common law was constitutionalized in the Confrontation Clause, 
it would have been the American conception of that law. And 
while attention has been paid to the English case, none seems to 
have been paid to a quite similar Framing-Era American case, 
the Delaware decision of State v. Baynard.21 In Baynard, 
hearsay was excluded not because it did not fit into an exception 
and not because it was not confronted, but because the out-of-
court declarant was incompetent to testify at the trial. 
II.  STATE V. BAYNARD 
In Baynard, a prosecution witness in a 1794 murder trial 
testified that he had a conversation with the deceased on the 
evening of the killing that concerned the deceased’s going to the 
defendant’s house. The defendant Baynard “objected to this 
evidence as hearsay. . . .”22 The defense counsel argued that the 
out-of-court statements did not fall within any hearsay exception, 
including explanatory evidence and dying declarations.23 
The prosecutor responded that the hearsay was being 
offered, 
not as in every respect regular evidence in itself, but 
as it would come in as introductory to that which was 
                                                          
21 1794 WL 184 (Del.O. & T. 1794). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. The attorneys for the defendant contended that:  
it is illegal, considered as a hearsay evidence. It comes within none 
of the exceptions in which hearsay evidence is admitted. It cannot be 
considered as explanatory or illustrative of other evidence, for none 
has yet been given. It cannot be admitted as relating the declarations 
of a dying man, because at the time the person who is since 
dead . . . could have had no contemplation of the future accident by 
which he was deprived of his life. 
Id. 
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good legal evidence. . . . Very frequently narratives 
would be quite unintelligible, if it were not permitted 
to relate circumstances, which though illegal as 
substantive evidence, may tend to introduce and 
explain what is admissible.24 
The court agreed with the defense that hearsay was generally 
inadmissible, but also seemed to indicate that the particular 
hearsay at issue might ordinarily be admissible: “Though the 
rule be general that hearsay evidence is illegal, yet this rule is 
subject to many exceptions. It would frequently be impossible to 
take advantage of legal evidence, without an occasional 
admission of hearsays to explain a narrative of facts.”25 
This looks very much like a modern evidentiary debate. The 
defense objects to an offered out-of-court statement as hearsay 
and contends that it must be excluded since it does not fit into 
any exception. The prosecution replies that the statement is not 
being offered as “substantive” evidence, but that it should be 
admitted solely to complete a narrative–an argument that seems 
to say that it was not being offered for the truth of the matter 
asserted. This call and refrain clearly emanate from the scripture 
                                                          
24 Id. 
25 Id. at *1. In addition, the court stated, “It is proper also to give his 
preface to his story, in most cases without interruption.” Id. See generally 
Jonakait, supra note 2, at 161 (discussing an 1800 New York murder trial, 
stating that witnesses generally started their testimony not by responding to 
questions, but by delivering a narrative, which was sometimes interrupted by 
a judge or opposing counsel, but the interruptions seem to have been limited 
to clarifying ambiguities in the narrative and at the conclusion of the 
narrative, however, questions and answers took over like in the modern 
format). 
 See also Thomas Y. Davies, Not “The Framers’ Design:” How the 
Framing-Era Ban Against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawrod-Davis 
“Testimonial” Formulation of the Scope of the Orginal Confrontation Clause, 
15 J. L. & POL’Y 349, (2007) (discussing the contention that hearsay often 
appeared in eighteenth-century English trials and concluding, “[b]ecause 
witnesses often simply narrated what they had to tell, it seems likely that 
witnesses who had been admitted to testify as to their own direct knowledge 
of events might also have mentioned another person’s unsworn statement in 
the course of their narrative testimony.”). 
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that hearsay is generally not admitted, a proposition so clear in 
Baynard that it went unchallenged by the prosecutor and was 
readily accepted by the court. The case further indicates that the 
rule was considerably developed by the time of the case, for all 
the participants agreed that there were accepted exceptions to the 
general ban that went beyond dying declarations. Indeed, the 
court noted that hearsay “is subject to many exceptions.”26 
Even though the Baynard court suggested that the offered 
hearsay might ordinarily be admissible, the court excluded the 
evidence because of the second ground tendered by the defense, 
which was that since the decedent-declarant was a slave, he 
could not have testified at the trial against the white defendant, 
and therefore his hearsay should not be admitted: 
[I]t is illegal evidence as proceeding originally from 
the mouth of a Negro, and now offered against a 
white person in the trial of a criminal charge of a 
capital nature. It would be absurd to receive that as 
evidence at second hand which could not be received, 
even on oath administered in court from the original 
person.27 
The court agreed, first noting that state laws had limited the 
privileges of blacks28 and then concluding: 
While these laws and this system continue in force, it 
                                                          
26 State v. Baynard,1794 WL 184, *1 (Del.O. & T. 1794)(emphasis 
added). 
27 Id. 
28  The court listed some of the laws: 
Many of our laws recognize the servile state of Negroes among 
us and seem to require them to be deprived of many privileges 
enjoyed by white persons. By a law made very early after the 
settlement of our government, Negroes were not allowed the 
trial by jury, nor to carry arms, meet in companies, etc. . . . An 
additional penalty is inflicted on the criminal intercourse of the 
sexes. . . No Negro can be employed to whip a white 
person. . . . By our Constitution, . . . suffrages at elections are 
confined to free white persons. 
Id. at *1. 
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would be both illegal and impolitic to admit the 
testimony of Negroes in any cases whatever wherein 
white persons are interested . . . . Therefore the 
witness can not give in evidence anything which he 
heard from Negro Richard.29 
A creative interpretation of Baynard could maintain that 
since the court concluded that the slave could not have testified 
in court, and since it held that his hearsay could not be 
admitted, the court was in essence determining that the out-of-
court statements were “testimonial,” much as a creative 
interpretation of Brasier contends. But of course, the court’s 
decision did not depend upon the character of the hearsay. 
Indeed, the court suggested that the same hearsay from a white 
decedent may have been admissible, and the hearsay was not 
excluded because it was “testimonial.” The court’s decision 
indicates nothing about when hearsay was “testimonial” or that 
anything depended on such a label. While it can be deduced that 
hearsay that “explain[ed] a narrative of facts” was then 
admissible as were dying declarations, Baynard says nothing 
about the admissibility of other out-of-court statements. The case 
was not about the right of confrontation, a general necessity for 
                                                          
29 Id. at *1. The Delaware courts did not always exclude blacks from 
testifying against whites in criminal cases. See State v. Bender, 1793 WL 548 
(Del.Quar. Sess.). Where a white man was charged with assaulting a free 
black woman, the court noted that Delaware statutes prohibited free blacks 
from testifying against whites but also granted free blacks the right “to obtain 
redress in law and equity for any injury to their person or property.” Bender, 
1793 WL 548 at 1. The court concluded that a criminal charge was a method 
of seeking such redress, and where the free black person was the only 
witness to the assault, she could testify. The court continued, “[W]e do not 
mean to say that a Negro is a witness between two whites, nor in cases like 
the present one when other proof can be procured, but only in the case where 
justice must otherwise fall.” Bender, 1793 WL 548 at *1. The case is also 
reported at State v. Bender, 1793 WL 550 (Del.Quar.Sess.); State v. Bender, 
1793 WL 551 (Del.Quar.Sess.); State v. Bender, 1793 WL 554 
(Del.Quar.Sess.); and State v. Bender, 1794 WL 556 (Del.Quar.Sess.) But 
cf. State v. Farson, 1794 WL 570 (Del.Quar.Sess.) (noting that a free black 
called by defendant and charged with assaulting a white person was 
prohibited from testifying). 
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an opportunity for cross-examination, or whether the hearsay at 
issue would otherwise have been admissible; rather, the case 
concerned witness competency. The court concluded, similarly 
to Brasier, that if a person would not have been a competent in-
court witness, then that person’s out-of-court statements were 
not admissible.30 Baynard, an American product of the Framing 
Era, says little, if anything, about the right to confrontation and 
confirms that Brasier said even less.  
While these two cases are not truly informative about the 
Framing Era views that led to the Confrontation Clause, that 
does not mean that examinations of early cases should cease if 
that age’s understandings are held to control modern 
interpretations of confrontation. The real goal should be not to 
gain a better understanding of the English views, but of 
American conceptions of the proper use of out-of-court 
                                                          
30  Baynard, 1794 WL 184 at *1. See also Respublica v. Langcake and 
Hook, 1795 WL 708 (Pa.). In a trial for “maihem (sic) and assault and 
battery,” the defense sought to admit as a dying declaration the out–of-court 
statements of the father of one of the defendants. Respublica, 1795 WL 708 
at *1. The court concluded that hearsay was generally inadmissible but that 
there were exceptions. Among the exceptions were “the declarations of the 
deceased person on an indictment for murder, founded principally on the 
necessity of the case.” Respublica, 1795 WL 708 at *2. Apparently the court 
did not limit this principle just to the declarations of the victim of the 
homicide, or at least the court did not find the father’s declaration 
inadmissible on that ground. Instead, the court refused to admit the evidence 
because the necessary necessity was absent, “there having been several 
witnesses present at the different transactions.” Respublica, 1795 WL 708 at 
*2. The court, however, went on to find an independent ground for 
exclusion, one that mirrored the rulings in Brasier and Baynard. The court 
noted that the declarant Thomas Langcake had been bound over as one of the 
participants in the crime and that he would have been indicted if he had not 
died before the indictments were returned. If indicted he would have been an 
interested party and could not have testified. The court concluded, “If 
indicted and alive, Thomas Langcake could not have been admitted as a 
witness to disprove the present charge. His declarations shortly before his 
death surely cannot be received in evidence. . . .” Respublica, 179 WL 708 
at *2. Once again, if the declarant would have been an incompetent in-court 
witness, his hearsay could not be admitted. See generally Respublica, 179 
WL 708. 
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statements in criminal trials. The Framers could only have put 
their own views into the Sixth Amendment. 
English cases may tell us something about that American 
understanding, but it would not be surprising in a world of little 
and difficult communication across the sea that American views 
would not be precisely the same as English notions. 
Furthermore, as I have contended elsewhere,31 American 
criminal procedure had diverged in significant ways from 
English procedure by the time of the Constitution to provide 
Americans with a more robust adversary system than England. 
The Sixth Amendment, at least in part, rejected English 
procedures and constitutionalized practices that had already 
emerged in the colonies and new states.32 If the Confrontation 
Clause’s purpose was to help ensure a fast-emerging American 
adversary system,33 then American sources must be especially 
examined, and so far the historical debates engendered by 
Crawford and Davis have not truly focused on the American law 
of the period.  
Unfortunately, relevant and available American case law 
from the Framing Era about evidentiary practices in criminal 
cases is slight,34 but the information that does exist should be 
weighed for what light it can bring to the American use of out-
of-court statements. 
                                                          
31 See Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause, supra note 2, 
at 108-19. 
32 For example, the Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to counsel 
when that right did not exist in England. See id. at 94-96. See also U.S. 
CONST. amend. VI. 
33 See Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the 
Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REV. 557, 622 (1988) (“correctly interpreted, 
the confrontation clause . . . is one of a bundle of rights that assures the 
accused the protection of our adversary system. It assures the accused the 
right to the adversarial testing of the prosecution’s evidence”). 
34 Cf. Randolph N. Jonakait, “Witnesses” in the Confrontation Clause: 
Crawford v. Washington, Noah Webster, and Compulsory Process, 79 TEMP. 
L. REV. 155, 197 (2006) (noting that “we cannot say what hearsay law really 
was in the United States in 1789”). 
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III.  THE ULYSSES 
The Ulysses stands as a rare example of American case law 
from the Framing Era which concerns evidentiary practices in 
criminal cases.35 The case involved Captain Lamb, a cruel and 
incompetent Captain, or at least that is what the mutineers 
maintained. Eight months after The Ulysses, a merchant ship, 
had sailed from Boston, the crew revolted, put the captain in 
irons, and placed first officer John Salter in command. Ten days 
after the revolt the ship arrived on the west coast of North 
America where two other Boston captains interceded, and Lamb 
was restored to command. When The Ulysses returned to 
Massachusetts, three officers and two seamen were indicted “for 
feloniously confining the master of The Ulysses, and 
endeavoring to excite a revolt in the ship.”36 
Although the defense contended that the defendants’ actions 
were justified, the jury convicted the charged officers and 
seamen.37 While these events have little significance today, the 
court’s opinion contains a long footnote about evidentiary 
determinations made during the trial. These rulings by an 
American federal court, which gave no indication that it was 
making new law, less than a decade after the adoption of the 
Sixth Amendment, should be of interest since many concerned 
hearsay issues and perhaps say something about Framing Era 
views of confrontation.38 
                                                          
35 The Ulysses, 24 F.Cas 515 (C.C.D. Mass. 1800) (No. 14,300). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 516. 
38 Of course, The Ulysses, decided after the Sixth Amendment was 
adopted, could not have been an inspiration for the Confrontation Clause, but 
the views held in 1800 were unlikely to differ significantly from those held 
but a few years earlier. Cases like The Ulysses would seem to reflect the 
common understandings of the law in the Framing Era. This mirrors an 
argument that Brasier has importance for interpreting confrontation even if 
the Framers were unaware of it. See Davies supra note 25, at 89 (noting that 
Brasier “and all other cases first reported in Leach’s Crown Cases were 
published too late to have come the Framers’ attention prior to the framing of 
the Confrontation Clause in 1789”). Champions of Brasier, however, 
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The starting point for The Ulysses, as it was for Baynard, 
was the general inadmissibility of out-of-court statements, 
although the federal court announced the prohibition in 
somewhat disguised fashion. The Ulysses court stated, “What 
others said, when the defendants were not present to contradict, 
is no testimony.”39 Hearsay, in other words, was usually 
banned. 
While prohibiting most out-of-court statements, the court’s 
ruling leaves open the possibility that something like tacit 
admissions were admissible, and clearly at least some of the 
defendants’ direct admissions could be entered into evidence. 
The court stated, “If the defendants, before the accusation, were 
said to have used expressions, which they did not deny, it is 
good evidence, because it is a confession, that they did utter the 
expressions.”40 
                                                          
maintain that it is important because it indicates the common understanding of 
the law in the Framing Era. See Friedman, supra note 16, at 116. Friedman 
notes that: 
We should not be distracted by the question of whether Brasier 
was known in the United States at the time the Sixth 
Amendment was drafted or adopted. In the respect relevant to 
the inquiry here, Brasier makes no new law. Rather, its 
significance is that it reflects the common understanding of the 
time. 
Friedman, supra note 16, at 116. Surely, however, American cases tell us 
what the relevant views were better than English decisions. See generally 
Friedman, supra note 16, at 116. 
39 The Ulysses, 24 F.Cas. at 516 n.2. Other courts of that era also stated 
that hearsay was not generally admissible in criminal cases. See United States 
v. Robins, 27 F.Cas. 825, 837 (D.S.C. 1799) (noting that hearsay is not 
admissible in cases “affecting . . . life or limb . . .”). 
40 The Ulysses, 24 F.Cas. 515, 516 n.2 (C.C.D. Mass. 1800) (No. 
14,300). One issue concerning an admission in The Ulysses depended on 
whether statements could be attributed to a defendant, but after concluding 
that they could be, the statements were admitted and the court found that: 
It was doubted whether the log book was the record of the mate, 
or of the captain. Captains of vessels were produced, who 
testified, that the log book is always considered as a record of 
truth; that it is the duty of a mate to keep one for the inspection 
of the owners of the ship; the mate is not bound to insert therein 
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The court also noted, “It was not permitted, that witnesses 
should testify, to what others said of the defendants, unless they 
were present. It was not permitted to testify, what others said, 
respecting expressions, used by defendant, unless they were 
present.”41 The court was limiting the use of out-of-court 
statements, but there is some ambiguity in the limitation. 
Perhaps the court was stating that hearsay could be admitted 
only if the in-court declarant was present when the hearsay was 
uttered. If so, the rulings prohibited multiple hearsay statements 
but nothing more. That interpretation would conflict with the 
ruling that statements made outside the presence of the defendant 
were not permitted.42 Instead, the second ruling more sensibly 
says that hearsay reports of defendants’ admissions were not 
admissible unless the in-court witness also heard the admissions. 
The “they” refers to “witnesses,” not “others.” The key phrase 
in the first statement is “what others said of the defendants,” 
which apparently means hearsay reports of the defendants’ 
actions. The court, to be consistent with its general ban on out-
of-court statements, was ruling that the in-court witness could 
report hearsay only if the in-court witness had firsthand 
knowledge of the defendants’ actions reported in the hearsay. 
                                                          
any thing false, even though commanded by the captain, and 
therefore a log book may be taken as the confession of the mate. 
Id. 
 In State v. Wells, 1790 WL 349 (N.J.), the court recognized that 
admissions could be powerful evidence and should be admitted. The court 
rejected the defendant’s contention that evidence of his oral confession should 
not be admitted because his written confession had already been introduced, 
concluding that if the defense position were adopted: 
this monstrous consequence would ensue, that if a criminal had 
twenty times acknowledged the commission of a fact, and should 
afterwards refuse to confess it, upon an examination before the 
justice, for the very purpose of preventing any proof of his 
former acknowledgments, he would, by his own act, defeat the 
ends of justice. 
Wells, 1790 WL 349 at *4. 
41 24 F.Cas. at 516 n.2. 
42 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
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Both rulings appear to permit the hearsay only when the out-of-
court statements would corroborate what the in-court witness 
testified to. This conclusion is buttressed by the court’s specific 
ruling that admitted prior out-of-court statements of an in-court 
witness not just to impeach,43 but also to corroborate the 
witness. The court stated, “Evidence to show, that a witness has 
given an account of a transaction, similar to what he has 
testified, is good corroboration of his testimony. And so vice 
versa.”44 
The Ulysses court also made a number of rulings about 
depositions that undercut Crawford’s conclusion that a deposition 
could be validly admitted in the Framing Era if the defendant 
had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the 
statement’s taking and if the declarant were unavailable. The 
Ulysses court stated a different general proposition about 
depositions: “In criminal prosecutions, depositions are not 
admitted as regular evidence, unless by mutual consent.”45 A 
                                                          
43 See also State v. Norris, 1796 WL 327, at *4 (N.C. Super.L & Eq. 
1796) (describing where a prosecutor was allowed to impeach his own 
witness with prior statements). 
44 The Ulysses, 24 F.Cas. 515, 516 n.2 (D. Mass. 1800). The court, 
however, did not allow all impeachment by prior statements. It was claimed 
that the witness P. Robinson “had told the American consul, in Canton, a 
story differing in some considerable circumstances from the testimony which 
had given in court.” Id. The court, however, would not allow questioning 
about this, stating “he was not bound to criminate himself.” Id. On the other 
hand, Robinson’s account of the events written shortly after the captain’s 
reinstatement was admitted to corroborate his in-court testimony. Id. 
45 Id. Some Framing Era cases did not admit defendant’s statements 
made in an examination before trial if the statements were not properly 
recorded. See, e.g., State v. Grove, 1794 WL 80 (N.C. Super. L. & Eq. 
1796) (noting that a defendant’s examination before a magistrate was not 
admitted because it was not recorded within two days) and United States v. 
Maunier, 26 F.Cas 1210 (C.C.D.N.C. 1792) (describing how a defendant’s 
examination before trial was not admitted because it was not signed by the 
prisoner). See also State v. Wells, 1 N.J.L. 424, 1790 WL 349, at *4 (N.J. 
1790) (noting that the court takes “the law to be, that parole evidence of the 
confession before the justice would be improper. . . “). But see State v. 
Irwin, 1794 WL 105, at *1 (N.C. Super. L. & Eq. 1794), where the court 
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concern over cross-examination was part of the animating force 
for this mutual-consent rule. In The Ulysses, parties had agreed 
to the taking of a deposition from one Sturges, but after its 
apparent completion, “some addition was made to it.” The 
prosecutor John Davis objected to the deposition’s admission, 
and the court excluded the evidence, stating, “Though this 
addition might have been true, yet Mr. Davis had no opportunity 
to cross-examine Sturgis on this point.”46 
                                                          
admitted defendant’s confession before a Justice of the Peace even though it 
was not properly recorded by the Justice. The court stated: 
There is certainly an impropriety in saying, that evidence may 
be received of a confession made before a private man, and that 
the same confession made before a Justice shall not, because he 
hath omitted to perform his duty. . . . [I]f the justice should not 
do his duty . . . , that shall not be of so much prejudice to the 
state that the evidence shall be lost. 
Irwin, 1794 WL 105, at *2. 
46 The Ulysses, 24 F.Cas. 515, 516 n.2 (D. Mass. 1800). Other cases 
from the era indicated the importance of cross-examination and its connection 
to hearsay. See, e.g., State v. Webb, 1794 WL 98 (N.C. Super. L. & Eq. 
1794), where the court refused to admit a deposition not because it was 
labeled “testimonial” evidence but because of the “rule of the common law, 
founded on natural justice, that no man shall be prejudiced by evidence which 
he had not the liberty to cross examine. . . .” Webb, 1794 WL 98, at *1. 
 One court of the era recognized that out-of-court statements should be 
admitted when cross-examination of the absent declarant would have been to 
no purpose. Schwartz v. Thomas, 1795 WL 529 (1795). In a slander action, 
the court admitted a letter from an absent declarant indicating that he had 
heard of the slander. The proponent of the letter said it was offered not for 
showing that the defendant had uttered the slander but to prove the extent of 
damages by establishing that the slander had spread. One of the judges 
concluded, “If the letter had not only stated that the report was known to the 
writer but had also averred that the plaintiff[-in-error] had propagated the 
report, such averment would have been inadmissible to prove this latter 
fact. . . .” Schwartz, 1795 WL 529, at *3. Since, however, cross-
examination of the letter writer could not have undercut the probative force 
of the letter to show the slander’s circulation, the letter was admissible. The 
judge stated: 
that the report had circulated so as to come to the knowledge of 
the writer, is as clearly established by the letter itself, as if he 
had deposed to the same effect . . . , and no cross examination 
JONAKAIT.DOC 9/22/2007  12:34 AM 
 BEYOND BRASIER’S IRRELEVANCE 489 
 
Even when there was an opportunity for cross-examination at 
the deposition, however, a deposition was still not admissible 
without mutual consent. Defendant Salter had offered a 
deposition from someone not named. The court noted that the 
deponent had relevant evidence, and the defendant had no legal 
method of detaining the deponent. This time no mention was 
made that the prosecutor had been denied the opportunity to 
cross-examine the deponent, but even so, the court indicated that 
it could not admit the deposition without the prosecutor’s 
consent. The court simply stated, “I have said, depositions are 
not legal evidence in criminal prosecutions.”47 The court, 
however, did show a concern that the defendant received a fair 
trial and obtained the prosecutor’s consent. The opinion noted, 
If the attorney for the district will not agree to the 
admission of this deposition, the cause must be 
continued. A similar determination of Lord Mansfield 
was quoted, in which he was said to have asserted, if 
the deposition were not admitted, the cause should be 
continued forever. The attorney agreed.48 
                                                          
could possibly do away a conviction that he who spoke of the 
report, had heard it. 
Schwartz, 1795 WL 529, at *3. The other judge similarly concluded: 
this case is very different from what it would have been, had the 
letter been produced to prove the speaking of the words, or the 
propagation of the report by the defendant. In the one case the 
party might have derived benefit from the cross examination of 
the writer, in the present case, it would have been impossible. 
Schwartz, 1795 WL 529, at *4. 
47 24 F.Cas. at 516, n.2. 
48 The Ulysses, 24 F.Cas. 515, n.2 (D. Mass. 1800). See also United 
States v. Moore, 26 F.Cas. 1308 (D. Pa. 1801), where the defendant was 
charged with a shipboard manslaughter. Defense asked for the trial to be 
delayed because two witnesses had shipped out again but were expected back 
at the next court term. The defense lawyers said that they had proposed to the 
prosecutor that depositions of the witnesses be taken where the prosecutor 
could have cross-examined, but the prosecutor refused to participate in the 
deposition. The prosecutor opposed the continuance stating that the defense 
should have moved to have their witnesses bound over as he had done with a 
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Another ruling on depositions stated, “Where there are 
several defendants, and one consents to the taking of a 
deposition, that deposition may not affect the other defendants, 
who did not consent to the taking of the deposition.”49 A 
deposition was not admissible simply because the accused might 
have been cross-examined at a deposition, for presumably if the 
defendants had consented, they would have been able to cross-
examine at the out-of-court proceeding. Instead, the mutual 
consent did more than simply preserve cross-examination; it 
allowed the parties to choose to have the cross-examination in 
front of the jury.50 
                                                          
number of prosecution witnesses, concluding that a trial delay would be 
unfair to the prosecution witnesses who were jailed pending the trial. After 
arguments about whether the defense would have had the authority to have 
their witnesses committed, the court continued the trial and ordered the 
release of the prosecution witnesses on the condition that their depositions be 
taken with the opportunity for defense cross-examination at the depositions. 
See generally Moore, 26 F.Cas. 1308. 
49 24 F.Cas. at 516, n.2. 
50 The Ulysses, 24 F.Cas. 515, n.2 (D. Mass. 1800). Defense attorneys 
of that era were arguing not just the importance of cross-examination, but the 
importance of cross-examination in front of the jury deciding the case. See 
United States v. Moore, 26 F.Cas. 1308 (D. Pa. 1801), where after the court 
suggested that depositions of prosecution witnesses could be taken, defense 
counsel responded: 
We have great objections to the depositions of these sailors. We 
wish to examine them in court and before the jury. We have 
good reason to suspect a conspiracy among them to fix this 
crime on the defendant. They have evinced the greatest heat and 
resentment towards him. A viva voce examination before the 
jury is necessary to our safety. On depositions, though we cross-
examine, we shall lose the manner, appearance, temper, &c., of 
the witnesses, so important in weighing their credit. 
Moore, 26 F.Cas. at 1308. See also United States v. Smith, 3 Wheeler C.C. 
100, 27 F.Cas. 1192, 1218 (D. N.Y. 1806), where defense counsel refused 
to consent to a commission examining absent witnesses and insisted on the 
importance of cross-examination in front of the jury, stating: 
Even in civil cases, I have more than once had occasion to 
lament the inroads that are made upon oral testimony, by the 
increased use of written depositions; and I am convinced that the 
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Perhaps most important in light of Crawford, the court 
nowhere indicated that the “testimonial” factor weighed into its 
decisions whatsoever, or that the court was even aware of such a 
concept. Indeed, the last of the court’s rulings on hearsay 
indicated that nothing depended on whether the out-of court 
statements were “testimonial” or not. The court stated, “Where 
a private journal was produced, that journal may be used against 
its author, but not against the other defendants.”51 A private 
journal is not the product of interrogation, much less 
governmental questioning. It bears little if any resemblance to an 
ex parte affidavit or deposition. Even though today it would be 
“nontestimonial” hearsay and could be admitted without 
violating the Confrontation Clause, it was not admissible against 
those who had not written it. That ruling, of course, followed 
from the court’s general proposition that hearsay was not 
admissible; that is “what others said [including another 
defendant], when the defendants were not present to contradict, 
is no testimony.”52 
The Ulysses says nothing directly about the right of 
confrontation, but it does show a Framing Era court’s concern 
about the use of out-of-court statements in a criminal case. Most 
important was its general prohibition of such evidence. The 
court allowed breaches to the ban, but they were quite limited 
with the court only permitting admissions, depositions taken by 
mutual consent, and out-of-court statements that would 
corroborate or impeach in-court testimony.53 
                                                          
latter frequently prevent the discovery of truth. Everyone knows 
that when a witness is examined in open court, the manner in 
which he answer, and the manner in which he declines to 
answer, are matters of public observation; and that cross-
examination may draw out more than could be obtained by 
studied and written answers to written interrogatories. 
Smith, 27 F.Cas. at 1215. 
51 The Ulysses, 24 F.Cas. at 516, n.2. 
52 Id. 
53 At least one American judge cast doubt about the admissibility of a 
deposition even if it had been properly taken. See State v. Moody, 1798 WL 
93 (N.C. Super. L. & Eq.), where in a murder trial, statements made by the 
JONAKAIT.DOC 9/22/2007  12:34 AM 
492 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
 
Of course, the case does not state whether excited utterances 
about an ongoing emergency from an absent declarant were 
admissible or not. The case is silent on the distinction drawn in 
Davis,54 but the case certainly undercuts the notion that the 
                                                          
deceased on the day after he was wounded to a Justice of the Peace were 
offered as dying declarations. Since, however, the declarant did not die until 
weeks later, the court did not admit the statements because they were not 
made when the declarant was without hope of life. Judge Haywood, however, 
suggested that the statements might be admissible as an examination under 
oath before a Justice of the Peace. The defense attorney objected that the 
declarant was first examined and then later sworn to the truth of the contents, 
rather than being sworn before he was examined. Judge Haywood, “thinking 
there might be something in [the defense] objection, did not insist upon 
receiving the testimony.” Id. at *1. While this might indicate that a 
deposition could be admitted when the proper forms were followed, the other 
judge gave broader grounds for the exclusion, which would have prevented 
its admission even if the deposition had been properly taken. Judge Stone 
stated, “I cannot think this paper is receivable at any rate; how is it possible 
a man can be a witness to prove his own death?” Id. 
54 The fact that courts had expressed concerns over admitting hearsay 
does not mean that courts did not also admit hearsay without reporting an 
explanation. See, e.g., State v. Negro George, 1797 WL 403 
(Del.Quar.Sess.) (describing where the report summarizes the testimony of 
many witnesses some of whom report the out-of-court statements of others). 
Thus, a prosecution witness testified that the owner of the defendant slave 
stated shortly after the crime that he (the owner) believed the defendant had 
been on the plantation at the relevant time. The reported opinion does not 
indicate any objection to this hearsay, but the owner’s declaration was 
exculpatory, and the owner later testified to the same effect. The prosecution 
witness, however, also testified that defendant’s mother stated that the 
defendant had shoes, an important issue because shoe prints had been found 
near the crime scene. This hearsay, however, seems to have been an 
explanation of the in-court testimony of how the witness came to compare the 
defendant’s shoes to the imprints at the scene. The witness testified that after 
the mother’s statement, the defendant produced his shoes, and the witness 
told the jury about the comparison he made. The hearsay was not the central 
evidence for the prosecution, which relied on the identification of the victim. 
Id. 
 See also State v. Lough, 1803 WL 750 (Del Quar.Sess.) (noting that in a 
trial for horse stealing, a witness said that when he saw the horse someone 
else told him that it was stolen and the evidence was not crucial because the 
owner of the horse had already testified as to its theft). 
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admissibility of hearsay in the Framing Era depended on 
whether or not out-of-court statements were “testimonial.” 
Indeed, the court gave no indication that the court was even 
aware of such a distinction. 
Perhaps most important, nothing in The Ulysses or any of 
the other cases cited here or that have been discussed in the 
aftermath of Crawford and Davis demonstrate that Framing Era 
prosecutions were upheld or even undertaken when the crucial 
evidence against the accused was an out-of-court statement of an 
absent witness, whether or not that hearsay was “testimonial.” 
The thought of such prosecutions never seems to have even 
occurred then.55 
What The Ulysses and the various cases previously discussed 
suggest is that American courts were seeking to provide fair, 
adversarial trials, and decisions about the use of out-of-court 
statements were just part of that concern. What The Ulysses 
should really teach is that the hearsay determinations of the 
Framing Era cannot be meaningfully analyzed apart from an 
analysis of the evolving criminal trial system as a whole, and 
that the Confrontation Clause should not be interpreted as if it 
can be segregated from related provisions in the Constitution.56 
CONCLUSION 
If a common law right to confrontation existed, it cannot be 
found in Rex v. Brasier, as some have contended. That case 
articulates no general principles about hearsay or confrontation. 
The similar American case of State v. Baynard, however, does 
suggest that in American courts during the Framing Era courts 
were announcing that hearsay was generally inadmissible, and 
The Ulysses further indicates that hearsay exceptions in 
American courts during that period were limited. Most 
                                                          
55 See supra note 54. 
56 See Jonakait, supra note 2, at 198 (noting that Crawford’s definition 
of “witnesses” in the Confrontation Clause conflicts with the use of that term 
in other parts of the Constitution and “Crawford’s analysis ignores 
confrontation’s Sixth Amendment context.”). 
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important, however, for the modern eye, none of the discussed 
cases show any concern over a distinction between “testimonial” 
and “nontestimonial” hearsay. 
Perhaps the approach of Crawford and Davis is a good one, 
but it is not one that has proven support from the historical 
record. We cannot know if the Framers of the Confrontation 
Clause would have found the distinction that the Court has 
articulated between the companion cases in Davis important, 
because the Framers, for practical purposes, said nothing about 
how they viewed that constitutional provision. But nothing in the 
historical record so far brought forth indicates that the 
distinction would have made any sense to them at all. Instead, 
what Crawford and Davis have done, it seems, is to launch 
something like a new common law of evidence where the 
language of those decisions has to be parsed without real 
reference to history or Sixth Amendment principles, for 
guidance on how new cases should be decided. 
 
